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THE CONTINUING SAGA OF RIPPLING PUDDLES, SMALL
HANDLES AND LINKS OF CHAINS: WETLANDS ACTION
NETWORK v. UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, wetlands have been perceived as useless impedi-
ments to agriculture and development.1 While wetlands originally
constituted 221 million acres of the continental United States, to-
day, only 100.9 million acres remain. 2 Since the early 1970's, wet-
lands have been recognized for their role in flood prevention
through the slow release of excess water. 3 Wetlands protect both
surface and groundwater by purifying storm water though the filtra-
tion of nutrients, sediments, and pollutants. 4 Additionally, many
endangered species depend on wetlands for survival.5 Although
the importance of wetlands as an integral part of the environment
is now understood, the federal regulation of wetlands, with its com-
plex history, remains a source of confusion. 6
This Note focuses on Congress' attempt to define the proper
scope of environmental impacts that the United States Army Corps
of Engineers (Corps) must consider when granting permits for the
discharge of dredged or fill material into United States' waters. 7
1. See MARK A. CHERTOK, Federal Regulation of Wetlands, SE98 ALI-ABA 715, 717
(ALI-ABA Course of Study 2000) (reporting "[a]nnual losses between 1985 and
1995 were approximately 117,000 acres; down from an estimated 290,000 acres per
year between 1970 and 1980, and an estimated 458,000 acres per year between the
1950s and the 1970s.').
2. See id. (indicating dramatic depletion of wetlands).
3. See id. (explaining perspective of wetlands shifted in early 1970s with reali-
zation that both freshwater and tidal wetlands provide important ecological value
and also demonstrating that wetlands' role in flood prevention became evident
during 1993 flooding along Mississippi River).
4. See id. (noting it has become clear that wetlands provide important wildlife
benefits, including nesting, wintering, resting and feeding grounds for numerous
species of migratory waterfowl).
5. See id. (observing "estuaries provide critical food sources, spawning grounds
and nurseries for coastal fish and shellfish on both coasts.").
6. See Chertok, supra note 1, at 718. Federal regulation of wetlands includes
the Rivers and Harbor Act of 1899 [hereinafter Rivers and Harbors Act], the Clean
Water Act of 1972 [hereinafter CWA], and several agencies including the United
States Environmental Protection Agency [hereinafter EPA], the Fish and Wildlife
Service [hereinafter FWS], and the National Marine Fisheries Service [hereinafter
NMFS]. See id. at 718-22.
7. See Matthew C. Porterfield, Rippling Puddles, Small Handles and Links of
Chain: The Scope of Environmental Review for Army Corps of Engineers Permit Decisions,
10 TUL. ENVL. L.J. 31, 32 (Winter 1996) (stating attempt to define proper scope
(119)
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The Corps' authority to grant permits arises under the Clean Water
Act (CWA) and is often compared to rippling puddles, small han-
dles, and links of a chain. 8 This Note attempts to determine which,
if any, of these metaphors provides a clear rule in determining the
proper scope of the Corps' environmental review.
While Section II of this Note presents the facts of Wetlands Ac-
tion Network v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,9 Section III examines the
applicability and effects of the Rivers and Harbors Act, the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, and judicial decisions construing
the extent of the Corps' jurisdiction.10 Section IV discusses the
Ninth Circuit's rationale in overturning the lower court's decision
to grant an injunction in Wetlands Action Network." Finally, Section
V analyzes other options the Ninth Circuit could have employed
and Section VI concludes with an assessment of the impact the
Ninth Circuit's decision will have on continued wetlands
development. 12
II. FACTS
The controversy in Wetlands Action Network arose from the
Corps' decision to grant Maguire Thomas Partners-Playa Vista Com-
pany (MTP-PV) a permit to fill 16.1 acres of federally-delineated
wetlands and to mitigate the fill by creating a fifty-one acre fresh-
of environmental impacts that the Army Corps of Engineers [hereinafter Corps]
must consider pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act [hereinafter
NEPA] in granting permits for discharges of dredged or fill material into waters
subject to Corps' regulatory authority has led to a variety of metaphors).
8. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1994); see also Porterfield, supra note 7, at 38. "Sec-
tion 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act makes it unlawful to 'excavate or fill, or in
any manner to alter or modify the course, location, condition, or capacity of...
any navigable water of the United States' without a permit from [ ] Corps." Id.
(citation omitted); see also Sylvester v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 884 F.2d
394, 400 (9th Cir. 1989) (indicating that, in viewing environmental effects, image
of scattered bits of broken chain is better than image of rippling puddles). "Each
segment stands alone, but each link within each segment does not." Id.
Environmental impacts are in some respects like ripples following the
casting of a stone in a pool. The simile is beguiling but useless as a stan-
dard. So employed it suggests that the entire pool must be considered
each time a substance heavier than a hair lands upon its surface. This is
not a practical guide.
Id. For a discussion of the small handle problem, see infra note 100 and accompa-
nying text.
9. 222 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2000)
10. For a discussion of the facts of Wetlands Action Network, see infra notes 13-39
and accompanying text.
11. See Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1105 (concluding that Corps' de-
termination did not conflict with applicable regulations).
12. For a further discussion of alternatives, see infra note 96 and accompany-
ing text.
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water wetland system. 13 MTP-PV's enormous project, covering
1,000 acres, proposed to develop residential areas, a marina and
numerous commercial developments, including hotels, retail estab-
lishments, an entertainment media and technology district, and a
Dreamworks® studio. 14 Wetlands Action Network and California
Public Interest Research Group (WAN) brought suit in the district
court alleging the Corps evaded its legal obligations under CWA
and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by granting
MTP-PV a fill permit pursuant to CWA section 404.15 The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of WAN on its NEPA
claims, invalidated the permit, and enjoined MTP-PV from begin-
ning any other construction in the area covered by the permit.16
13. SeeJason Vest, No Dream Deal for Them, The Real Estate Market is a Wake-Up
Call for Dreamworks, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY, No-
vember 4, 1996, at 1.
DreamWorks has .. captured the public's imagination with its lofty plans
to build not just a new studio complex but the company town of the fu-
ture. It has entered the real-estate business with megadeveloper Maguire
Thomas Partners - and has received generous tax breaks from the city
of Los Angeles, which views the project as a potential economic boon.
But the project is already months behind schedule and could be delayed
for years.
Id.; see also CEQ Terminology and Index, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.20 (2000).
'Mitigation' includes: (a) Avoiding the impact altogether by not taking a
certain action or parts of an action. (b) Minimizing impacts by limiting
the degree or magnitude of the action and its implementation. (c) Recti-
fying the impact by repairing, rehabilitating, or restoring the affected en-
vironment. (d) Reducing or eliminating the impact over time by
preservation and maintenance operations during the life of the action.
(e) Compensating for the impact by replacing or providing substitute re-
sources or environments.
Id.; see also Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1105. Wetlands Action Network and
California Public Interest Research Group [hereinafter WAN] brought suit in the
district court alleging that the Corps failed to meet its responsibilities under NEPA
and CWA. See id. at 1109.
14. See Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1110 (explaining project caused
great deal of dispute because Playa-Vista property is largest remnant parcel of un-
developed land in heavily urbanized portion of Los Angeles County); see also Vest,
supra note 13, at 1-2.
The plan entails spending $7 billion to develop a 1,087 acre tract known
as Playa Vista, or "Beach View" for the Spanish challenged - one of the
last sizable tracts of undeveloped coastal land in the Los Angeles area.
Home to the Ballona Wetlands (which have been more or less dry since
1941, when the Army Corps of Engineers sluiced Ballona Creek into a
concrete trench), the land brought little joy to its previous owner, How-
ard Hughes, another movie producer.
Id.
15. Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1109 (discussing district court's denial
of MTP-PV's motion to intervene as a right in NEPA claims but grant of MTP-PV's
motion in alternative for permissive intervention). See id. The intervention, how-
ever, limited MTP-PV's participation in the NEPA claims to the relief phase. See id.
16. See id. (finding Corps violated NEPA).
2002]
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MTP-PV had planned to develop the Playa Vista property since
1979.17 The proposed project, however, generated great conflict
insofar as the Playa-Vista property is the largest remnant parcel of
undeveloped land in a heavily urbanized western portion of Los An-
geles County. 18 Before requesting a permit for its activities, MTP-
PV met with the Corps and proposed to divide the project into
three separate phases, each requiring three separate permit appli-
cations.1 9 The first phase included a request for "the authorization
to fill 7.8 acres of scattered wetland patches in Areas B, C, and D for
mixed-use development."20 This phase also included the creation
of a fifty-two acre freshwater wetland complex to mitigate the loss
resulting from the fill. 21 The second phase of the project included
the restoration and creation of a salt marsh in one-hundred sixty
acres of designated wetlands in Area B. 22 The third and final phase
of the project involved "the development of a marina and the eco-
logical enhancement of the Ballona flood control channel which
involves the dredging and filling of 9.8 acres of wetlands in Area
A."23 The Corps agreed that dividing the project into three parts
was permissible since each proposed phase had an independent
purpose.24
MTP-PV sought its first permit from the Corps, in August 1990,
to fill 16.1 acres of federally-delineated wetlands as part of Phase I
of the project.25 In October of 1990, MTP-PV concluded that there
17. See id. at 1110 (discussing litigious history of Playa Vista Project).
18. See id. The Playa Vista property contains approximately 186 acres of feder-
ally delineated wetlands. See id. MTP-PV's project planned to dredge and fill 21.4
acres of wetlands. See id.
19. See id. (indicating MTP-PV and Corps joined to determine proper divi-
sion of project for permitting purposes).
20. Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1111. "For planning purposes, MTP-
PV divided the Playa Vista project site into four parcels designated Areas A, B, C,
and D." Id. at 1110. MTP-PV planned mixed-use development for these parcels.
See id.
21. See id. MTP-PV proposed mitigation to compensate for the 21.4 acres of
wetlands that would be dredged and filled during the three phases of Playa Vista
project. See id. "The creation of the freshwater wetland system would require fill-
ing 7.7 acres of wetlands in Area B for the berm (4.0 acres of which would be
restored to wetlands leaving 3.7 acres as permanently filled)." See id.
22. See id. Restoring the degraded wetlands and converting uplands to wet-
lands would create a salt marsh system of about 230 acres. See id.
23. Id. at 1110. Of the 9.8 acres, 3.7 consist of a man-made drainage ditch
and 8.1 acres are scattered, degraded wetlands. See id. at 1111.
24. See id. at 1112 (noting Corps evaluated cumulative impacts of proposed
project in Environmental Assessment [hereinafter EA]). For a further discussion
of EA, see infra note 67 and accompanying text.
25. See Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1111. In this phase of the project,
MTP-PV proposed to fill eight acres of man-made flood control ditches and de-
graded wetlands located in seventeen isolated patches across the Playa-Vista prop-
4
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was no environmentally sensitive and practical alternative to build-
ing that would result in less significant environmental impacts. 26
On January 2, 1991, the Corps issued a public notice of the permit
application, stating that an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
was not required for the work proposed in Phase I of the project.27
In keeping with protocol, the Corps requested feedback from the
interested public and relevant state and federal resource agencies
concerning the proposed development.28 The responses ques-
tioned whether the permit application contained a sufficiently de-
tailed analysis of project alternatives and whether the permit
provided a comprehensive evaluation of the cumulative impacts at-
tributable to the entire project.29
After several meetings, the Corps ultimately determined that
the division of the project into three separate phases was logical.30
erty. See id. MTP-PV proposed to fill the remaining eight acres located in Area B
by creating a 51.1 acre freshwater wetland system consisting of twenty-six acres of
freshwater marsh and twenty-five acres of freshwater riparian corridor. See id. Four
of the latter eight acres are to be restored to wetlands and the remaining four are
to be permanently filled to create a berm between the freshwater system and
saltwater marsh that MTP-PV plans to restore as part of Phase II of the project. See
id.
26. See id. "The analysis describes six alternatives including four different
configurations of the mixed-use development which avoid all or part of the wet-
lands as well as the possibility of using an offsite location for the development." Id.
27. See id. The notice described the complete Playa Vista development and
the activity for which the permit was requested. See id. This notice also included a
preliminary determination that an EIS would not be needed. See id.
28. See id. The Corps expanded the period for review at EPA's request from
February 2, 1991 to February 15, 1991. See id. The resulting comments came from
a variety of sources, such as the general public, environmental groups and both
state and federal agencies, including FWS, NMFS, and EPA. See id.
29. See id. MTP-PV submitted comments addressing those issues raised and
offered a revised "Practical Alternative Analysis" containing an analysis of five alter-
natives to the mixed-use development portion of the project and six alternatives to
the freshwater wetland system portion. See id. Additionally, MTP-PV put forward
three scientific studies to further supplement its analysis: "Biological Value of the
Ballona Wetlands System," "Water Balance for the Proposed Freshwater Wetland
System," and "Water Demand of the Proposed Ballona Freshwater Wetland Sys-
tem." See id.
30. See Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1111-12. In order to address con-
cerns of both public and environmental groups regarding the three permit ap-
proach to the project, the Corps met with representatives of FWS, NMFS, EPA, and
California Department of Fish and Game. See id. At this meeting, the agencies
requested that the Corps delay review and approval of any component of the pro-
ject until MTP-PV submitted an application for Phase II of the project due to con-
cerns over the three permit approach. See id. at 1111-12. The Corps, however,
ignored the agencies' requests to delay review and approval. See id. Instead, the
Corps issued the permit and, on February 25, 1992, sent an informal notice of
intent to issue MTP-PV's permit to NMFS, EPA, and FWS pursuant to CWA
§ 404(q). See id. After reviewing MTP-PV's documentation addressing the agen-
cies' concerns, the Corps found MTP-PV's responses acceptable, but concluded
2002]
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Subsequently, the Corps issued a Finding of No Significant Impact
(FONSI) on July 1, 1992. 31 The Corps' evaluation of cumulative
impacts concluded it was unnecessary to include substantial consid-
eration of the upland development since such development was
outside its jurisdiction.3 2 Thus, the Corps did not require an EIS
and issued the permit on April 20, 1993.33 MTP-PV subsequently
filled, cleared and graded the wetlands in the permit area.34
The district court rescinded the permit and found the Corps
violated NEPA by improperly limiting the scope of its analysis.35
The district court further found that even if the scope of the analy-
sis was proper, the Corps' decision to issue an Environmental As-
sessment (EA) rather than an EIS was arbitrary and capricious.3 6
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found the district court
erred in finding that the Corps violated NEPA.37 The Ninth Circuit
also held that the Corps' decision was neither arbitrary nor capri-
cious. 38 According to the Court of Appeals, the Corps did not have
that MTP-PV must prove in-kind mitigation for the salt marsh habitat lost as a
result of the project. See id. EPA, NMFS and FWS made no further objections to
Phase I of the project upon receiving the requested technical information. See id.
31. See id. at 1112. The Corps finally decided that no other alternatives would
result in any less adverse impact upon the environment. See id.; see also 43 Fed.
Reg. 56003, 56004 (Nov. 29, 1978) (defining Environmental Assessment [hereinaf-
ter EA] and Finding of No Significant Impact [hereinafter FONSI]). "Due to the
relatedness of the three phases, however, Corps found that it would accept mitiga-
tion credit for the future projects as part of Phase I, provided that the later phases
eventually receive authorization and that 'success criteria' for the freshwater wet-
land system are met." See Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1112. For a further
discussion of FONSI and EA, see infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
32. See Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1112 (noting effect on surrounding
areas need not be included in NEPA review of permit application). For a discus-
sion of cumulative impacts, see infra note 75 and accompanying text.
33. See id. (indicating project would not have significant impact on quality of
human environment).
34. See id. (stating MTP-PV took action pursuant to issuance of permit).
35. See id. at 1113 (finding that analysis should not have been limited to the
impacts of activities covered by permit, but should have been considered impacts
associated with whole development project).
36. See id. (explaining that requiring only EA "was arbitrary and capricious
because of the untested nature of the freshwater wetlands system, the lack of a fully
developed mitigation plan, and the controversy that surrounded the Corps' deter-
mination of the permitted activities' nature and effect."). The EA contained an
examination of "alternatives to the project including: (1) no action alternative; (2)
alternative project designs; (3) the creation of a salt marsh in lieu of the freshwater
wetland system; and (4) possible off-site locations." Id. at 1112.
37. See Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1122. The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision to deny MTP-PV's motion to intervene, reversed the
district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded to vacate the injunc-
tion. See id.
38. See id. at 1118 (commenting upon deference given to agency's determina-
tion of jurisdiction).
6
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to issue an EIS considering the environmental consequences of the
entire Playa Vista project.39
III. BACKGROUND
Wetlands are broadly defined as "those areas inundated or sat-
urated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration suffi-
cient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support,
a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil
conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs, and
similar areas." 40 Wetlands regulations involve a complex legislative
scheme involving a number of federal agencies.41
A. Rivers and Harbors Act
Before 1972, federal control of wetlands was limited to Section
10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 (Rivers and
Harbors Act).42 The Rivers and Harbors Act regulates navigable wa-
ters of the United States and prohibits dredging, filling, or placing
structures in those waters without a permit issued by the Corps. 43
39. See id. at 1117 (determining federal jurisdiction does not establish enough
"control and responsibility" to federalize the entire project).
40. Chertok, supra note 1, at 723-24 (citing Corps of Engineers, Department
of the Army, Definition of Waters of the United States, 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (2002)
and Environmental Protection Agency, Ocean Dumping, Section 404(b)(1)
Guidelines for Specification or Disposal Sites for Dredged or Fill Materials, Defini-
tions, 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(t) (2002)) (noting that while CWA does not define "wet-
lands," Corps and EPA apply same definition of term). Under 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3(b), the Corps defines wetlands as:
The term wetlands means those areas that are inundated or saturated by
surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to sup-
port, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of
vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands
generally include swamps, marshes, bogs, and similar areas.
Id. Identically, under 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(t), EPA defines wetlands as:
The term wetlands means those areas that are inundated or saturated by
surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to sup-
port, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of
vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands
generally include swamps, marshes, bogs and similar areas.
Id.
41. See id. at 718 (describing backdrop for federal regulation of wetlands); see
also Patrick A. Parenteau, Small Handles, Big Impacts: When Do Permits Federalize Pri-
vate Development?, 20 ErvTL. L. 747, 749 (1990) (discussing Corps and "small han-
dle" problem). For a further discussion of the small handle problem, see infra note
100 and accompanying text.
42. See Chertok, supra note 1, at 718 (remarking thatjurisdiction under Rivers
and Harbors Act "is limited to waters affected by tidal flow or which have been
used, or are susceptible to use, for interstate or foreign commerce.").
43. See id. at 718-19 (reporting statute intended to protect government's inter-
est in navigability of waterways).
2002] 125
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Under the Rivers and Harbors Act, the Corps' jurisdiction is limited
to waters affected by tidal flow, waters that have been used for inter-
state or foreign commerce or those waters susceptible to use in in-
terstate commerce.
44
B. Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Act
CWA Section 404 provides the primary basis for federal wet-
lands regulation. 45 Enacted in 1972, CWA's federal interest is "to
restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integ-
rity of the Nation's waters." 46 Section 404 authorizes the Corps to
issue permits to discharge dredged or fill material into waters of its
jurisdiction. 47 The Corps also has authority to issue "general per-
mits" for categories of similar activities that have a minimal environ-
mental impact when considered either individually or
cumulatively.48
44. See Corps of Engineers, Department of the Army, General Regulatory Poli-
cies, 33 C.F.R. § 320.1 (1994). The Corps is a highly decentralized organization
with authority to administer the regulatory program that approves jurisdictional
determinations, permit denials, and declined individual permits. See 33 C.F.R.
§ 320.1(a) (2) (1994).
45. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994); see also Chertok, supra note 1, at 719 (noting
CWA reflected far broader federal interest than navigation alone).
46. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994).
47. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1994); see also Permits for Discharges of Dredged
of Fill Material into Waters of the United States, 33 C.F.R. § 323.1 (2001).
"'Dredged material' is defined as 'material that is excavated or dredged from wa-
ters of the United States.'" 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (2001). The Corps defines "fill
material" as "any material used for the primary purpose of replacing an aquatic
area with dry land or of changing the bottom elevation of an waterbody." 33 C.F.R.
§ 323.2(e) (1994).
48. See 33 U.S.C § 1344(e) (2001).
(1) In carrying out his functions relating to the discharge of dredged or
fill material under this section, the Secretary may, after notice and oppor-
tunity for public hearing, issue general permits on a State, regional, or
nationwide basis for any category of activities involving discharges of
dredged or fill material if the Secretary determines that the activities in
such category are similar in nature, will cause only minimal adverse envi-
ronmental effects when performed separately, and will have only minimal
cumulative adverse effect on the environment. Any general permit issued
under this subsection shall (A) be based on the guidelines described in
(b)(1) of this section, and (B) set forth the requirements and standards
which shall apply to any activity authorized by such general permit.
(2) No general permit issued under this subsection shall be for a period
of more than five years after the date of its issuance and such general
permit may be revoked or modified by the Secretary if, after opportunity
for public hearing, the Secretary determines that the activities authorized
by such general permit have an adverse impact on the environment or
such activities are more appropriately authorized by individual permits.
8
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EPA, however, has regulatory authority under CWA and the
Section 404(b) (1) guidelines, which must be satisfied in order for a
permit to be issued. 49 Additionally, EPA has authority to prohibit
the disposal of dredged materials at certain sites if there would be
an "unacceptable adverse effect" on environmental resources. 50
EPA may also delegate Section 404 authority to individual states
considering permits for discharges into intrastate waters. 5 1
Pursuant to Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act and Sec-
tion 404 of CWA, the Corps controls a significant number of per-
mitting decisions.52 These decisions require a determination of
whether to require an EIS for the issuance of a permit for the dis-
charge of dredged or fill material into waters of the United States,
extending to wetlands. 53 In determining whether to grant a permit
under Section 404, the Corps applies EPA's Section 404(b) (1) envi-
ronmental guidelines, requiring a review of both individual and cu-
mulative impacts. 5 4 Generally, the Corps denies a permit if a viable
alternative to the proposed discharge exists that would cause a di-
minished effect on the aquatic ecosystem.5 5 Further, the Corps may
deny permits if the discharges will cause significant degradation of
United States' waters. 56
While the Corps and EPA both control the regulation of wet-
lands, the functions of each agency differ in their enforcement
49. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b) (1994). The Guidelines state, "[t]he purpose of
these Guidelines is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of waters of the United States through the control of discharges of
dredged or fill material." Environmental Protection Agency, Ocean Dumping,
Section 404(B) (1) Guidelines for Specification or Disposal Sites for Dredged or
Fill Material, 40 C.F.R. § 230.1(a) (2000).
50. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (1994); see also Chertok, supra note 1, at 721 (not-
ing EPA has sparingly exercised its "veto" power to prohibit Section 404 permits).
51. See Chertok, supra note 1, at 721 (explaining that EPA retains authority to
object to State's proposed permit); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1344(g) (1) (1994) (setting
forth procedure for state to propose and administer its own permit program).
52. See Parenteau, supra note 41, at 750 (defining "navigable waters" as naviga-
ble bodies of water and tributaries).
53. See Porterfield, supra note 7, at 38 (discussing Corps' jurisdiction over dis-
charge of dredge or fill material into United States' waters pursuant to Rivers and
Harbors Act § 10 and CWA § 404).
54. See id. at 39; see also 40 C.F.R. § 230.6(c) (2002). For a further discussion
of "cumulative impacts," see infra note 75 and accompanying text.
55. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a) (2002); see also Porterfield, supra note 7, at 39-40
(noting CWA § 301 prohibits discharge of "any pollutant by any person" into
United States' waters without permit).
56. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(c) (2002); see also Porterfield, supra note 7, at 40
(finding Corps must follow its own guidelines, requiring consideration of environ-
mental factors in determining whether issuance of permit is in public's interest).
2002]
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power and jurisdiction. 57 Furthermore, the Corps and EPA are not
the only federal agencies involved in wetland regulation. Other
federal and state agencies, such as the Fish and Wildlife Service
(FWS) and the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS)
provide consultation regarding permitting decisions. 58 To further
confuse the complex regulatory scheme, CWA assigns state agencies
the responsibility of issuing state water quality certifications neces-
sary for discharges requiring a Section 404 permit.5 9
C. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 in response to the national feeling that "we cannot continue
on this environmentally destructive course ... [for o]ur natural
resources ... are not unlimited. '60 The prime proponent of NEPA,
Senator Jackson, called the Act "the most important and far-reach-
ing environmental and conservation measure ever enacted."61 Sen-
atorJackson hoped the Act would help avert an otherwise inevitable
environmental catastrophe. 62
NEPA provides the framework for determining the steps fed-
eral agencies must take in order to assess the environmental conse-
quences of certain actions. 63 NEPA does not require an agency to
57. See Chertok, supra note 1, at 722 (remarking that Corps' enforcement au-
thority is limited to administrative or judicial actions related to unauthorized dis-
charges and permits previously issued and revealing EPA's enforcement extends
only to state-issued permits).
58. See id. Pursuant to CWA and the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, FWS
comments upon applications of individual CWA § 404 permits and certain general
permits. See id. The Natural Resources Conservation Service nonetheless controls
the "Swampbuster" program designed to eliminate the conversion of wetlands for
agricultural purposes. See id. State agencies must prepare a state water quality
certification for discharges requiring a § 404 permit. See id. Furthermore, the
agency responsible for the State's coastal zone management program must submit
a "consistency determination" which the proposed discharge is within a coastal
zone. See id.
59. See id. (indicating states may assume same power of permitting discharges
into intrastate waters).
60. S. REP. No. 91-296, at 5 (1969); see also Terence L. Thatcher, Understanding
Interdependence in the Natural Environment: Some Thoughts on Cumulative Impact Assess-
ment Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 20 ENVrL. L. 611-12 (1990) (ex-
plaining NEPA goals were early methods of identifying environmental
consequences of government action and dealing with environmental problems
before each reached crisis proportions).
61. S. REP. No. 91-296, at 5 (1969) (discussing NEPA's intent).
62. See 115 CONG. REc. 40,416 (1969). SenatorJackson wanted NEPA to "pre-
vent ... environmental abuse and degradation caused by Federal actions before
they got off the planning board." Id.
63. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4332 (1994). NEPA provides in pertinent part:
10
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reach a conclusion that will protect the environment. 64 Rather,
NEPA requires an agency that proposes legislation or government
action that may impact the environment to conduct an EA.65 The
results of the EA determine whether the agency may issue a FONSI,
thereby deciding to forego an EIS.6 6 If an agency determines that
the federal action will not have a significant effect on the environ-
ment through an EA, it must make that decision available to the
The Congress authorizes and directs to the fullest extent possible: (1) the
policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be inter-
preted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this
chapter, and (2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall
(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach ... in planning and in
decisionmaking which may have an impact on man's environment; (B)
identify and develop methods and procedures .. . which will insure that
presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given
appropriate consideration in decisionmaking along with economic and
technical considerations; (C) include in every recommendation or report
on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by
the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environ-
ment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term produc-
tivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
which would be involved in the proposed action should be
implemented.
42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1994). Federal agencies must also consult with one another and
the public before finalizing a major project. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (1994).
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (F) (1994). All agencies of the federal government
shall "recognize the worldwide and long-range character of environmental
problems, and where consistent with the foreign policy of the United States, lend
appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed to maximize
international cooperation in anticipating and preventing a decline in the quality of
mankind's world environment .... Id.
65. See id.
66. See CEQ Terminology and Index, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13 (2001). The Fed-
eral Register reported:
'Finding of no significant impact' means a document by a Federal agency
briefly presenting the reasons why an action, not otherwise excluded
(§ 1508.4), will not have a significant effect on the human environment
and for which an environmental impact statement therefore will not be
prepared. It shall include the environmental assessment or a summary of
it and shall note any other environmental documents related to it
(§ 1501.7 (a)(5)). If the assessment is included, the finding need not
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public. 67 In the event that an EA reveals that the action will have a
significant effect on the environment, the federal agency must pre-
pare an EIS.68
An EIS serves two primary functions: (1) to detail possible eco-
nomic and environmental effects of proposed federal action on
others; and (2) to create sufficient channels for feedback between
the federal agency and interested parties. 69 A well-prepared EIS
lists the alternatives to the proposed action, reveals the potential
effects of the actions on the surroundings, and takes into account
public response to the action.70 Section 102(2) (C) of NEPA re-
quires each EIS to include an evaluation of the environmental im-
pacts of proposed 'major federal actions' that may significantly
effect the environment. 71 Major federal actions are those actions
67. See CEQ NEPA and Agency Planning, 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(e)(1) (1978)
(discussing whether to prepare an environmental impact statement). According
to the Code of Federal Regulations:
'Environmental Assessment':
(a) Means a concise public document for which a Federal agency is re-
sponsible that serves to:
(1) Briefly provide sufficient evidence and analysis for determining
whether to prepare an environmental impact statement or a finding of
no significant impact.
(2) Aid an agency's compliance with the Act when no environmental im-
pact statement is necessary.
(3) Facilitate preparation of a statement when one is necessary. (b) Shall
include brief discussions of the need for the proposal, of alternatives as
required by [§] 102(2) (E), of the environmental impacts of the proposed
action and alternatives, and a listing of agencies and persons consulted.
40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (2002).
68. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (2001) (discussing statutory require-
ments for environmental impact statements); see also CEQ Environmental Impact
Statement, 40 C.F.R. § 1502 (1978) (detailing purpose and process for completing
environmental impact statement as device to guarantee protection of environment
as part of federal government action). The environmental impact statement is a
detailed document devised to "assure that agencies give proper consideration to
the environmental consequences of their actions." Merell v. Thomas, 807 F.2d
776, 777-78 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); see also Melaney
Payne, Note, Critically Acclaimed But Not Critically Followed - The Inapplicability of the
National Environmental Policy Act to Federal Agency Actions: Douglas County v. Babbitt, 7
VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 339, 349 (1996).
69. See Payne, supra note 68, at 349 (noting two primary purposes of environ-
mental impact statements). Environmental Impact Statements exist to detail possi-
ble economic and environmental effects of the proposed federal action on others
and to afford sufficient channels for feedback between the federal agency and in-
terested parties. See id.; see also 40 C.F.R. § 1502.19 (2002).
70. See Payne, supra note 68, at 349 (citing Andrea L. Hungerford, Note,
Changing the Management of Public Land Forests: The Role of Spotted Owl Injunctions, 24
ENV-L. L. 1395, 1401 (1994)). "The environmental impact statement serves the
purpose of providing information to allow 'agency officials [to] make the best in-
formed decisions based upon an understanding of the environmental conse-
quences of their actions.'" Id.
71. See Porterfield, supra note 7, at 34.
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with effects that may be major and which are potentially subject to
federal control and responsibility. 72
D. The Council on Environmental Quality Regulations
The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) promulgates
regulations implementing NEPA.73 Under these regulations, a "ma-
jor federal action" includes decisions by federal agencies approving
or granting permits for otherwise private actions.7 4 CEQ regula-
Each EIS must discuss: (i) the environmental impact of the proposed ac-
tion, (ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented, (iii) alternatives to the proposed
action, (iv) the relationship between local and short-term uses of man's
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term pro-
ductivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of re-
sources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be
implemented.
Id.; see also Corps of Engineers, Department of the Army, Processing of Depart-
ment of the Army Permits, 33 C.F.R. pt. 325 App. B § 7(b)(2) (1995); 42 U.S.C.
4332(2) (C) (2000).
72. For a further discussion of 'major federal action,' see infra note 74 and
accompanying text.
73. See Porterfield, supra note 7, at 55.
74. See 43 Fed. Reg. 56,003, 56,004 (Nov. 29, 1978) (defining major federal
action). According to the Federal Register:
'Major Federal action' includes actions with effects that may be major and
which are potentially subject to Federal control and responsibility. Major
reinforces but does not have a meaning independent of significantly
(§ 1508.27). Actions include the circumstance where the responsible of-
ficials fail to act and that failure to act is reviewable by courts or adminis-
trative tribunals under the Administrative Procedure Act or other
applicable law as agency action.
(a) Actions include new and continuing activities, including projects and
programs entirely or partly financed, assisted, conducted, regulated, or
approved by federal agencies; new or revised agency rules, regulations,
plans, policies, or procedures; and legislative proposals (§§ 1506.8,
1508.17). Actions do not include funding assistance solely in the form of
general revenue sharing funds, distributed under the State and Local Fis-
cal Assistance Act of 1972, 31 U.S.C 1221 et seq., with no Federal agency
control over the subsequent use of such funds. Actions do not include
bringing judicial or administrative civil or criminal enforcement actions.
(b) Federal action tend to fall within one of the following categories: (1)
Adoption of official policy, such as rules, regulations, and interpretations
adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 551 et
seq.; treaties and international conventions or agreements; formal docu-
ments establishing an agency's policies which will result in or substantially
alter agency programs.
(2) Adoption of formal plans, such as official documents prepared or
approved by federal agencies which guide or prescribe alternative uses of
federal resources, upon which future agency actions will be based. (3)
Adoption of programs, such as a group of concerted actions to imple-
ment a specific policy or plan; systematic and connected agency decisions
allocating agency resources to implement a specific statutory program or
executive directive. (4) Approval of specific projects, such as construc-
2002]
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tions direct agencies to consider the cumulative impacts of the ac-
tion. 75  Additionally, CEQ regulations prevent entities from
"breaking [the action] down into small component parts," and thus
avoiding the requirement of an EIS.76 The CEQ regulations fur-
ther require agencies to consider both the direct and indirect ef-
fects of an action. 77
E. NEPA and the "Small Handle" Issue
There are many instances in which the action requiring a Sec-
tion 404 permit is part of a larger proposal. 78 In Save the Bay, Inc. v.
United States Army Corps of Engineers,79 the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit found the Corps was not required to assess the total
tion or management activities located in a defined geographic area.
Projects include actions approved by permit or other regulatory decision
as well as federal and federally assisted activities.
Id.
75. See CEQ Terminology and Index, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (1978). Under the
Code of Federal Regulations:
Cumulative impact is the impact on the environment which results from
the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present,
and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency (Fed-
eral or non-Federal) or person undertakes such actions. Cumulative im-
pacts can result from individually minor but collectively significant
actions taking place over a period of time.
Id.; see also Thatcher, supra note 60, at 613. The Code continues:
Current regulations of the [CEQ] define a cumulative impact as the im-
pact on the environment which results from the incremental impact of
the action [being analyzed] when added to the other past, present, and
reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency (Federal
or non-Federal) or person undertakes such other actions.
40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (1978).
76. Porterfield, supra note 7, at 34-35 (discussing CEQ regulations implement-
ing NEPA and announcing criteria agencies must consider when determining
whether to grant permit); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b) (7) (2000) (listing appro-
priate considerations involved in evaluating severity of environmental impact).
77. See Porterfield, supra note 7, at 35. Direct effects are those "which are
caused by the action and occur at the same time and place." Id. By contrast, indi-
rect effects are those "which are caused by the action and are later [sic] in time or
farther removed in distance, but are still reasonably foreseeable." Id.; see also 40
C.F.R. §§ 1508.8(a), (b) (2000). The regulations further define indirect effects as
including "growth inducing effects and other effects related to induce changes in
the pattern of land use, population density or growth rate as well as related effects
on air and water and other natural systems, including ecosystems." 40 C.F.R.
§ 1508.8(b) (2000).
78. See Chertok, supra note 1, at 749.
For example, a proposal for an apartment complex on uplands may in-
clude a marina that requires a [§] 404 permit. Several cases in the mid-
1980's allowed Corps to limit the scope of its NEPA assessment to the
aspects of the overall project within its [§] 404 [or § 10] jurisdiction.
Id.
79. 610 F.2d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 900 (1980) (hold-
ing NEPA did not require Corps as matter of law to consider construction of entire
14
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impacts of a proposed titanium dioxide manufacturing facility.8 s°
Instead, the Corps could limit its review to the construction of an
outfall pipeline from the facility through nearby wetlands. 8' Simi-
larly, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in Winnebago
Tribes of Nebraska v. Ray,82 found that the participants in a power
line project were only required to assess impacts of stream crossings
and not the impacts of the entire 67-mile transmission line.8 3
In some instances, however, courts have rejected the limited
scope of review employed in cases like Save the Bay and Winnebago
Tribes.84 For example, the Central District of California, in Colorado
River Indian Tribes v. Marsh,85 rejected the Corps' decision to limit
its NEPA review of a permit application to the area directly within
the Corps' jurisdiction.8 6 The proposed development included a
156 acre residential and commercial complex on the west side of
the Colorado River that required stabilization of the riverbank.87
The Central District of California found that the Corps improperly
limited the scope of its inquiry and thus violated NEPA.88 The dis-
manufacturing plant in determining whether or not EIS was necessary with respect
to pipeline).
80. See Porterfield, supra note 7, at 42 (illustrating case as one of two opinions
issued in 1980 limiting Corps' NEPA review to waters subject to Corps' regulatory
jurisdiction).
81. See Save the Bay, Inc. 610 F.2d at 327; see also Porterfield, supra note 7, at 42
(concluding pipeline construction would not cause significant environmental im-
pacts necessitating preparation of environmental impact statement).
82. 621 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 836 (1980).
83. See id. at 272-73; see also Porterfield, supra note 7, at 43-44 (discussing
Eighth Circuit's affirmation of district court's decision denying Winnebago Tribe's
request for permanent injunction against construction of sixty-seven mile power
line through parts of Nebraska and Iowa).
84. See Porterfield, supra note 7, at 47 (indicating separate inquiries are re-
quired to determine whether action is major and whether significant environmen-
tal impacts will occur); see also Colorado River Indian Tribes v. Marsh, 605 F. Supp
1425, (C.D. Cal. 1985).
85. 605 F.Supp at 1433 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
86. See id. (quoting CEQ Terminology and Index, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (2000))
(revealing NEPA and CEQ regulations clearly require Corps to consider both di-
rect and indirect effects); see also Porterfield, supra note 7, at 47 (finding Colorado
Indian Tribes court viewed scope of review in Winnebago and Save the Bay as improp-
erly analyzing requirements for EIS review). "[ Winnebago and Save the Bay] improp-
erly [suggest] that in order to determine whether a federal action triggered the
EIS requirement, there must be a separate inquiry into whether the action was
'major,' in addition to determining whether the action had significant environ-
mental impacts." Id.
87. See Colorado River Indian Tribes, 605 F. Supp. at 1455 (noting developer
must obtain permit from Corps in order to stabilize bank and stating approval
from County of Riverside cannot be obtained without bank stabilization).
88. See id. (indicating that Corps' decision to assess only those impacts physi-
cally dependent upon activities within its jurisdiction, river and its immediate
banks limited review to only primary impacts).
20021
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trict court emphasized that direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts
of a proposed major federal action must be addressed. 89 In 1988,
the Corps modified its regulations to address the issues raised by
these cases.90
In Thomas v. Peterson,91 the Ninth Circuit found that logging
operations and the construction of a road to facilitate logging and
timber sales were "connected actions" because "the timber sales
[could not] proceed without the road and the road would not be
built but for the contemplated timber sales." 92 On the other hand,
in Morongo Band of Indians v. Federal Aviation Administration,93 the
Ninth Circuit found that the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) did not improperly segment NEPA review of an airport's ar-
rival enhancement project from review of a larger airport expan-
sion project because each project had independent utility. 94
F. Control and Responsibility Regulations
At the time of the Colorado River Indian Tribe opinion, the Corps
operated under a standard that required the Corps' environmental
review to consider whether all phases of the project dependent
upon the permit could have significant effects on the environ-
ment.9 5 In 1984, the Corps proposed to replace that standard with
the "control and responsibility" regulation requiring the Corps to
89. See id. The Colorado River Indian Tribes Court remarked:
It must be remembered that the basic thrust of an agency's responsibili-
ties under NEPA is to predict the environmental effects of proposed ac-
tion before the action is taken and those effects fully known. Reasonable
forecasting and speculation is thus implicit in NEPA, and we must reject
any attempt by agencies to shirk their responsibilities under NEPA by la-
beling any and all discussion of future environmental effects as 'crystal
ball inquiry.'
Id. at 1434 (quoting City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 676 (9th Cir. 1975));
see also Porterfield, supra note 7, at 47 (stating NEPA and CEQ regulations clearly
require Corps to consider both direct and indirect effects).
90. For a further discussion of the control and responsibility regulations, see
infra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
91. 753 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985).
92. See Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d 1105, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000). "Apply-
ing this same analysis, we have rejected claims 'that actions were connected when
each of two projects would have taken place with or without the other and thus
had 'independent utility.'" Id. (quoting Thomas v. Patterson, 753 F.2d 754, 758
(9th Cir. 1985)).
93. 161 F.3d 569 (9th Cir. 1998).
94. See Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1118 (explaining that expansion
project would aggravate problems being addressed by project, but finding project
was independent action designed primarily to deal with existing problems and
therefore not connected to future expansion project).
95. See Porterfield, supra note 7, at 48-49 (discussing Corps' proposal to re-
place existing standard with "control and responsibility" regulations).
16
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consider an entire project only when there was "sufficient Federal
control over or responsibility for the entire project to 'federalize' it
for pt:rposes of NEPA."96 Initially, EPA rejected this so-called small
handle approach but finally adopted the new regulations in 1988. 97
One commentator noted that the small handle approach is
best illustrated by circuit courts' adopting the rationale that no EIS
was required unless the permitted activity itself, without the non-
federal portion of the project, could have a significant environmen-
tal impact.98 In 1989, the Ninth Circuit decided Sylvester v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers,99 interpreting the "control and respon-
sibility" rule to limit the scope of the Corps' environmental review
to its regulatory jurisdiction. 10 0 One expert illustrated Sylvester's in-
96. Id. at 48 (noting adoption of "control and responsibility" regulations on
February 3, 1988).
97. See id. at 48-49 (revealing EPA first objected to proposed rule, but adopted
it after slight modifications); see also CEQ Regulations Implementing NEPA, CEQ
Predecision Referrals to the Council of Proposed Federal Actions Determined to
be Environmentally Unsatisfactory, 40 C.F.R. § 1504 (1995).
98. See Parenteau, supra note 41, at 749-50.
By early 1980, the Corps had succeeded in convincing two U.S. Courts of
Appeals - and recently a third - that its regulatory jurisdiction deter-
mines the scope of its NEPA obligations. In each of these cases, the cir-
cuit courts held that unless the permitted activity itself could cause a
significant environmental impact - apart from the nonfederal portion of
the project - no EIS would be required. By extension, this logic also
would limit the scope of any required EIS to the effects of the specific
activity subject to the Corps' jurisdiction, plus any cumulative or indirect
effects that one could tie to the permitted activity.
Id. (referencing Sylvester v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 871 F.2d 817 (9th Cir.
1989); see also Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Ray, 621 F.2d 269, 272 (8th Cir. 1980);
Save the Bay, Inc. v. United States Corps of Eng'rs, 610 F.2d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1980).
99. 884 F.2d 394 (9th Cir. 1989). In Sylvester, a citizen challenged Corps' deci-
sion to grant a developer a Section 404 permit for filling eleven acres of wetlands
to construct an eleven-acre golf course as part of a resort in Squaw Valley, Califor-
nia. See id. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, holding that the
Corps had erred in limiting its NEPA review to the golf course rather than the
entire resort complex. See id.
100. See Parenteau, supra note 41, at 749 (noting "small handle" problem
might be best illustrated by way Corps convinced three circuits that its regulatory
jurisdiction determines scope of its NEPA analysis). In each of these cases, the
courts held that unless permitted activity itself could cause a significant environ-
mental impact, no EIS would be required. See id.; see also California Trout v. Schae-
fer, 58 F.3d 469 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding federal agency's decision to limit scope
of NEPA review to impacts associated with fill of wetlands rather than considering
impact on downstream fisheries from entire canal project); Enos v. Marsh, 769
F.2d 1363, 1371-72 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding agency's decision to exclude impact
of non-federal shore facilities for new deep draft harbor from its NEPA analysis);
Friends of the Earth v. Coleman, 518 F.2d 323, 328 (9th Cir. 1975) (finding that
agency was not required to prepare EIS for state funded projects in partially feder-
ally funded airport development before any work could proceed).
2002]
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terpretation of the "control and responsibility" regulation by
hypothesizing:
[A]ssume that a developer plans to build a multifaceted
resort, including a hotel, golf course and ski runs. If the
golf course is to be built in a wetland area, it needs a
Corps of Engineers Section 404 permit. In reviewing the
environmental impacts of its decision, the Corps will con-
sider only the effect of the wetland filling for the golf
course, but not the effects of the entire resort.101
Essentially, the Sylvester court upheld the foregoing analysis by re-
versing the district court's adoption of the "control and responsibil-
ity" regulation as a permissible interpretation of NEPA.10 2 The
Sylvester court further held that, under the regulation, the Corps
properly limited its environmental review to the wetlands rather
than considering the entire resort. 10 3 The Ninth Circuit also noted
this approach was permissible as long as the results of an "indepen-
dent utility" test indicated an insufficient relationship between the
two components. 10 4
Notably, the Ninth Circuit, in Sylvester, rejected the metaphor
comparing the environmental impacts to "ripples following the
casting of a stone in a pool."' 05 Instead, the Ninth Circuit adopted
the image of a broken chain, "some segments of which contain nu-
merous links, while others have only one or two. Each segment
stands alone, but each link within each segment does not."10 6 Since
101. See Thatcher, supra note 60, at 634-35 (discussing Corps' revisions to
NEPA regulations).
102. See Sylvester v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 884 F.2d at 394 (9th Cir.
1989).
103. See id. (rejecting argument that regulation was inconsistent with require-
ment in CEQ regulations that agencies address indirect effects of their proposed
actions).
104. See id. (explaining that determination of sufficient relationship is based
upon variety of factors, particularly interdependence of upland and jurisdictional
components and "independent utility" test); see also Thatcher, supra note 60, at
632.
What can be said about this independent utility theory in light of the law
of cumulative impacts, cumulative actions, and connected actions? To
begin with, one has to determine whether multiple projects are repre-
sented by actual proposals and whether they may have cumulative im-
pacts. If there is no possibility of cumulative impacts and the projects are
not connected because they have independent utility, then they need not
be considered in the same EIS for any purpose.
Id.
105. Sylvester, 884 F.2d at 400 (remarking that metaphor suggests an impracti-
cally broad scope of NEPA review).
106. See id.
18
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the golf course and the rest of the resort could each exist without
the other, they were not "two links of a single chain."' 107 The notion
that one segment of the project could exist without the other im-
plies that the Ninth Circuit applied a "but for" causation test. l08
The "links of chain" metaphor suggests there must be a high level
of proximity as well as a causal relationship between the environ-
mental action and the environmental impacts at issue in order to
warrant review of the federal and non-federal portions of the pro-
ject.109 As to federal review of private portions of permit proposals,
Sylvester focused on the "causal relationship between the proposed
major federal action and the resulting environmental impacts and
not on the scope of the Corps' regulatory jurisdiction."'110
In Sylvester, the Ninth Circuit upheld the Corps' decision to
limit its review to the impacts of the golf course construction, rather
than the entire resort complex.11' The Sylvester court concluded
that a sufficient relationship to constitute one federal action for
NEPA purposes is not created simply because two aspects of a pro-
ject will benefit from each other's presence.112
107. See id. (finding rest of resort need not be considered in determining
whether to grant CWA § 404 permit for golf course).
108. See Porterfield, supra note 7, at 51 (suggesting that pure "but for" causa-
tion is more consistent with "ripples in the puddle" metaphor that court rejected
as broad and impractical).
109. See id. at 51 (suggesting it is unclear what, in addition to "but for" causa-
tion, is necessary to bring environmental impacts within private portion of partially
federal project within scope of NEPA).
110. Id.; see also Thatcher, supra note 60, at 634 (commenting upon revisions
of regulations being viewed as attempt to evade its responsibility to consider cumu-
lative and secondary, or indirect, impacts). The Corps generally has decided to
omit non-federal portions of permitted projects from environmental review. See id.
at 634-35.
111. See Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d 1105, 1116 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing
Sylvester v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 884 F.2d 394, 396-97 (9th Cir. 1989)
(finding Corps had no jurisdiction over upland development).
112. See Sylvester, 884 F.2d at 400-01. "We upheld the agency's decision, find-
ing that although the golf course and the entire resort complex 'would benefit
from the other's presence' they were not sufficiently interrelated to constitute a
single 'federal action' for NEPA purposes." Id.; see also California Trout v. Schaefer,
58 F.3d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding agency's decision to limit scope of its
NEPA review to impacts associated with fill of wetlands rather than impacts on
downstream fisheries from entire canal project); Enos v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 1363,
1371-72 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding agency's decision to exclude from its NEPA
analysis impact of non-federal shore facilities for new deep draft harbor); Friends of
the Earth, Inc. v. Coleman, 518 F.2d 323, 328 (9th Cir. 1975) (finding agency was not




Roche: The Continuing Saga of Rippling Puddles, Small Handles and Links
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002
138 VILLANovA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JouRNAL [Vol. XIII: p. 119
Later cases, such as National Wildlife Federation v. Wistler 31 3 and
Morgan v. Walter'14 followed the lead of Sylvester.)15 In Whistler, a
developer had proposed a residential development with boat access
to the Missouri River. 116 There, the Eighth Circuit upheld a lower
court decision to allow the Corps to limit its review to the boat ac-
cess aspect of the project because the residential development was
on uplands and "would proceed even without the creation of water
access." 117 In Morgan, however, the Eighth Circuit relied on the
"links of chain" analogy but held that a fish propagation facility
could not exist without the stream diversion and required the
Corps to evaluate the impacts of both components.118
The Federal District Court for the Western District of Washing-
ton, in Alpine Lakes Protection Society v. United States Forest Service,119
reached a similar conclusion regarding the implications of Sylves-
ter.120 The district court did not agree with the Forest Service's con-
113. 27 F.3d 1341 (8th Cir. 1994).
114. 728 F. Supp. 1483 (D. Idaho 1989).
115. For a further discussion of Sylvester, see supra notes 99-113 and accompa-
nying text.
116. See Whistler, 27 F.3d at 1343; see also Porterfield, supra note 7, at 54 (ex-
plaining NWF challenged Corps' failure to define proposal as housing project in
order to determine alternatives).
117. Whistler, 27 F.3d at 1341 (noting residential development would proceed
regardless of water access); see also Porterfield, supra note 7, at 54.
The Court of Appeals repeatedly stressed, however, that the Corps' deci-
sion not to address the housing development was based upon a finding
that the development would proceed regardless of whether the Corps
granted the dredge and fill permit. Thus, although the court viewed Syl-
vester as permitting the Corps to exclude consideration of a related but
independent private project from its environmental review of a permit
application, it also apparently recognized that this limitation would not
apply if a private project would not proceed if the permit were not
granted.
Id.
118. See Morgan, 728 F. Supp. at 1483; see also Porterfield, supra note 7, at 52
(finding fish propagation could not exist without links of chain including
diversion).
Thus, in the district court's view the primary issue under Sylvester was not
whether the private fish propagation facility had somehow become 'feder-
alized,' but rather whether it was reasonably foreseeable that the admit-
tedly federalized creek diversion would result in the construction of the
fish propagation facility with all its concomitant environmental impacts.
Id.
119. 838 F. Supp. 478, 478 (W.D. Wash. 1993).
120. See Alpine Lakes, 838 F.Supp at 478 (noting Sylvester preceded Alpine
Lakes); see also Porterfield, supra note 7, at 53 (comparing Morgan decision to Alpine
Lakes decision). An environmental group sought to compel the Forest Service to
consider environmental impacts of the timber management project and of tempo-
rary road access across national forest lands. See Alpine Lakes 838 F. Supp. At 478.
The group argued that the Forest Service failed to consider the environmental
20
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tention that it was only required to consider the impacts of the
actions it directly controlled. 121 The Alpine Lakes court claimed,
"the question whether the environmental impact of the related ac-
tion must be considered does not turn on whether that action is
federal or non-federal in nature." 122
The Western District of Washington found the controlling is-
sue to be the "functional interdependence" of the actions in ques-
tion and required the Forest Service to consider the environmental
impacts of the construction of the road and the planned timber
management activities. 123 The Ninth Circuit's rejection of the dis-
trict court's interpretation, in Wetlands Action Network, prevented
WAN from overcoming the "small handle" problem due to the
Ninth Circuit's rejection of several cases the district court deter-
mined as controlling.124
In 1983, the Supreme Court, in Metropolitan Edison Company v.
People Against Nuclear Energy (PANE) 125 indicated the proper stan-
dard of review was analogous to the proximate cause inquiry in tort
law, finding that "there must be a reasonably close causal relation-
ship between a change in the physical environment [due to the fed-
eral action] and the effect at issue."' 26 Thus, PANE provides
impacts of the private timber management activities, resulting from the road con-
struction. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 482 (explaining Forest Service must consider impact of logging
activities for which proposed access road is to be built when determining whether
EA or EIS is required for Big Boulder and noting failure to consider connected
action on that basis is arbitrary and capricious).
123. See id. at 482; see also Porterfield, supra note 7, at 53 (relating implication
of "functional interdependence"). "Thus, because the only purpose of the road
was to make possible the planned timber management activities, the Forest Service
was required to consider those activities in determining whether granting the per-
mit would have significant environmental effects." Id.
124. See Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d 1105, 1116-19 (9th Cir. 2000) (re-
jecting district court's interpretation of Thomas and Blue Mountains); see also
Thomas v. Patterson, 753 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985) (requiring Forest Service to
consider environmental impacts of two related federal actions in single permit);
Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1988)
(holding CEQ regulations required Forest Service to consider five related timber
sales in single NEPA analysis).
125. 460 U.S. 766, 774 (1983) (rejecting claim that Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission improperly failed to consider psychological harm that might result to
members of community from risk of nuclear accident in determining whether to
grant permit pursuant to NEPA).
126. Id.; see also Porterfield, supra note 7, at 36 (noting proper standard of
review). This analysis is similar to that of proximate cause in tort law in which the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's conduct was not only the factual
cause of the injury, but it was also the proximate or legal cause of the harm. See id.
2002]
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another basis for examining the scope of the Corps' analysis.' 27
The Court concluded that "but for" causation alone is insufficient
to require an EIS because it would require consideration of some
impacts "simply too remote" from the direct environmental impacts
of a major federal action. 128 The Court further noted that the
scope of an agency's inquiries must be manageable to ensure that
NEPA's goal of "a fully informed and well considered decision" is
achieved. 129
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit, in Wetlands Action Network, affirmed in part
and reversed in part the district court's grant of summary judgment
in favor of WAN and remanded the case to the district court to
vacate the judgment. 130 The crux of the Ninth Circuit's analysis
127. See Porterfield, supra note 7, at 36-37 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 42, at 272-73 (5th ed. 1984). Prosser
and Keeton describe the standard for proximate cause similarly to the CEQ regula-
tions. See id. According to Prosser and Keaton, "the scope of liability should ordi-
narily extend to but not beyond all 'direct' (or 'directly traceable') consequences
[of a defendant's negligence] and those indirect consequences that are foresee-
able." Id. at 36.
128. See Metropolitan Edison Company v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460
U.S. 766, 774 (1983) [hereinafter PANE] (suggesting but for causation is insuffi-
cient to require EIS). The PANE Court revealed:
Our understanding of the congressional concerns that led to the enact-
ment of NEPA suggests that the terms "environmental effect" and "envi-
ronmental impact" in § 102 be read to include a requirement of a
reasonably close causal relationship between a change in the physical en-
vironment and the effect at issue. This requirement is like the familiar
doctrine of proximate cause from tort law.
Id.
129. See id. at 776 (indicating time and resources are simply too limited to
extend NEPA as far as Court of Appeals has taken it.)
130. See Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d 1105, 1122 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting
Ninth Circuit's holding). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision
and found that MTP-PV did not assert a legally protectable interest that relates to
the NEPA claims. See id. The district court denied MTP-PV's motion to intervene
as of right and the Ninth Circuit reviewed the court's ruling as a matter of right de
novo. See id. at 1113 (citing Forest Conservation Council v. United States Forest
Service, 66 F.3d 1489, 1493 (9th Cir. 1995)). The Ninth Circuit explained that,
according to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a), to intervene in a cause of
action an applicant must claim "an interest relating to the property or transaction
which is the subject of the action." FED. R. Crv. P. 24(a). The protection of the
applicant's interest must be practically impaired or impeded by the action if the
applicant is not allowed to participate in the litigation. See id.; see also Wetlands
Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1113. The Ninth Circuit applied the following four-part
test to determine whether MTP-PV had a right to intervene:
1. the motion must be timely;
2. the applicant must claim a "significantly protectable" interest relating
to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action;
22
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focused on its disagreement with the district court's ruling that the
Corps violated NEPA.13i
A. Segmentation of the Project and the Independent Utility
Test
The district court found that the Corps improperly omitted the
uplands portion of the development from the analysis of the Phase
I actions involving the wetlands.' 3 2 WAN successfully argued that
the Phase I development would not proceed without the permit
and the filling of the wetlands would not be justified without the
upland development. 133 WAN also asserted that the Corps must
consider the whole of Phase I as a "federal action" for NEPA pur-
poses. 134 The Ninth Circuit, however, found that the two activities
were interrelated, but could be distinguished as separate actions ex-
isting independently of each other.1 35 The court cited precedent
3. the applicant must be so situated that the disposition of the action may
as a practical matter impair or impede its ability to protect that inter-
est; and
4. the applicant's interest must be inadequately represented by the par-
ties to the action.
Id. (citing Sierra Club v. EPA, 995 F.2d 1478, 1481 (9th Cir. 1993)). "The rationale
for our rule is that, because NEPA requires action only by the government, only
the government can be liable under NEPA." Id. at 1114 (citing Churchill County
v. Babbitt, 150 F.3d 1072, as amended by 158 F.3d 491 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining
that because private party cannot violate NEPA, it cannot be defendant in NEPA
compliance action).
131. See Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1122 (finding Corps' determina-
tion of scope of NEPA review and its issuance of FONSI was not arbitrary and
capricious). The lower court's injunction was based on finding that the Corps had
not followed NEPA guidelines. See id.
132. See id. at 1115-16 (discussing Corps' omission of uplands analysis of
Phase I actions). The Corps determined that the EA "need not include substantial
consideration of development in the uplands because development could occur in
those areas regardless of whether this permit application is granted." Id. at 1115.
Following this line of reasoning, the Corps only considered the environmental im-
pacts resulting from MTP-PV's application to fill 16.1 acres of wetlands in con-
structing Phase I of the development. See id.
133. See id. at 1116 (noting importance of permit and upland development).
Essentially, WAN asserted that upland development and the permitted activities
are functionally interdependent, meaning one can not exist without the other. See
id.
134. See id. (arguing location and configuration of wetlands to be filled
greatly affected design of mixed use development in Phase I and therefore whole
project should be treated as federal action).
135. See id. (finding that "linkage the district court found between the permit-
ted activity and the specific project planned is the type of 'interdependence' that is
found in any situation where a developer seeks to fill a wetland as part of a large
development project."). The Court noted that "[i]f this type of connection were
sufficient to require a finding that an entire project falls within the purview of the
Corps' jurisdiction, the Corps would have jurisdiction over all such projects includ-
ing those which the Corps' regulation cite as examples of situations in which the
2002]
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for upholding an agency's decision to limit the scope of its NEPA
review with respect to the federal portions of the activity.13 6
While the district court found Wetlands Action Network distin-
guishable from Sylvester, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the ratio-
nale from Sylvester should be applied to the instant case.137 By
rejecting the district court's determination that Thomas should con-
trol the outcome of Wetlands Action Network, the Ninth Circuit found
that Thomas did not control when the federal agency performing
the environmental review was without control over the entire pro-
ject.138 In sum, the Ninth Circuit held that the Corps could find
the 16.1 acres directly under its jurisdiction was separable from the
remainder of the acreage being developed outside of the Corps'
jurisdiction.1 39 The Ninth Circuit further explained that federal ju-
risdiction over the sixteen acres did not constitute the "control and
responsibility" necessary to federalize the entire project. 140
Corps would not have jurisdiction over the whole project." Id. at 1116-17 (citing
Corps of Engineers, Department of the Army, Processing of Department of the
Army Permits, 33 C.F.R. Pt. 325 App. B § 7(b)(3) (1995)).
136. See Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1116 (explaining precedent limit-
ing scope of NEPA review). "We have upheld an agency's decision to limit the
scope of its NEPA review to the activities specifically authorized by the federal ac-
tion where the private and federal portions of the project could exist indepen-
dently of each other." Id.
137. See id. The Sylvester Court found that the Corps' grant of a permit to fill
eleven acres of wetlands in order to construct part of a golf course that was part of
a larger resort complex was proper even though the Corps limited its review to the
impacts of the golf course construction. See id. The court, in Sylvester, justified this
decision in that the Corps had no jurisdiction over the upland development. See
id.
138. See id. at 1117; see also California Trout v. Schaefer, 58 F.3d 469 (9th Cir.
1995) (noting Thomas decision should not control when federal agency does not
have control over entire project). Wetlands Action Network differs from Thomas inso-
far as Thomas involved a challenge to the Forest Service's determination that the
environmental impacts of two related federal actions were not required to be con-
sidered in a single permit. See Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1117. The For-
est Service did not dispute that it needed to assess the environmental impacts of
both actions at some point and that it had jurisdiction over both actions. See id. In
contrast to Thomas, the Ninth Circuit found the Corps did not have independent
jurisdiction over the parts of Phase I development that did not require the filling
of wetlands. See id.
139. See Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1117 (concluding record sup-
ported Corps' determination that it did not have jurisdiction over upland develop-
ment). The court indicated that the project could have proceeded without the
permit. See id. Furthermore, since the project was not financed by federal money,
federal regulations did not apply. See id.
140. See id. at 1117 (citing 33 C.F.R. pt. 325 App. B § 7(b) (3) (1995) (noting
"control and responsibility" is determined by extent entire project will be within
Corps'jurisdiction)). For a further discussion of control and responsibility regula-
tions, see Parenteau, supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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Next, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the overall wet-
lands project was improperly segmented into three phases for pur-
poses of granting federal permits. 4 1 The Ninth Circuit found that
each of the three phases could exist independently of the other,
but warned,
Although federal agencies are assigned the primary task of
defining the scope of the NEPA review and their discrimi-
nation is to be given 'considerable discretion,' connected
or cumulative actions must be considered together to pre-
vent an agency from 'dividing a project into multiple 'ac-
tions,' each of which individually has an insignificant
environmental impact, but which collectively have a sub-
stantial impact.' 142
The court explained that, pursuant to CEQ regulations, use of
an "independent utility" test determines whether an agency must
consider multiple actions in a single NEPA review. 143 The Ninth
Circuit concluded that the three phases were not connected actions
and that each phase had independent utility. 144 Accordingly, the
Ninth Circuit held that the Corps was not required to consider the
three phases of a project in a single NEPA analysis. 145
141. See Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1118 (discussing CEQ regulations
implementing NEPA requirements that an agency consider "connected actions"
and "cumulative actions" within single EA or EIS).
142. Id. (quoting Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 758 (1985)). The court, in
Wetlands Action Network, included in its decision the CEQ regulations for determin-
ing whether actions are "connected." The court determined that actions are con-
nected when they:
(i) Automatically trigger other actions which may require environmental
impact statements;
(ii) Cannot or will not proceed unless other actions are taken previously
or simultaneously;
(iii) Are interdependent parts of a large action and depend on the larger
action for their justification.
CEQ Terminology and Index, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25 (a)(1) (2002). The court also
noted that "[c]umulative actions are those 'which when viewed with other pro-
posed actions have cumulatively significant impacts.'" Wetlands Action Network, 222
F.3d at 1118 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25 (a)(2) (2000)).
143. Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1118 (explaining scope of "indepen-
dent utility" test under CEQ regulations).
144. See id. at 1118-19 (noting Phase 1 can be constructed independently of
Phases II and III); see also Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1285 (9th Cir.
1974) (finding that EIS must cover a whole project when "[t]he dependency is
such that it would be irrational, or at least unwise, to undertake the first phase if
subsequent phases were not also undertaken.").
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The Ninth Circuit also rejected WAN's argument that the
Corps should have considered the three phases together as "cumu-
lative actions" pursuant to Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Black-
wood."46 The Ninth Circuit distinguished the two cases factually by
explaining that the five sales in Blue Mountains constituted cumula-
tive actions because they involved a single project and were reasona-
bly foreseeable. 147 The Ninth Circuit opined that requiring the
Corps to analyze the environmental impacts of the three phases in a
single EA or EIS would be impractical. 148 The court concluded that
neither the Ninth Circuit precedent nor the CEQ regulations re-
quired the Corps to consider the three phases together as cumula-
tive actions. 149
B. Determination of Necessity of EIS
Further, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's deter-
mination that the Corps improperly issued a FONSI instead of a
complete EIS. 150 The court agreed with the Corps' decision that a
full EIS was not required. 151 The court explained that " [i]f the pro-
posed action will have a significant impact, the agency must prepare
an EIS which addresses in detail the purpose and need for the ac-
tion, the environmental impacts of the action, and alternatives to
the action." 5 2 The Ninth Circuit further indicated that CEQ's reg-
ulations require agencies to consider the context and intensity of
146. See id. .at 1119 (differentiating Wetlands Action Network from Blue Moun-
tains). Blue Mountains involved a challenge to the Forest Service's determination
that a single timber salvage sale would not have a significant environmental im-
pact. See Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1215 (9th
Cir. 1998).
147. See Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1119. The Ninth Circuit distin-
guished the two cases and explained that, in Blue Mountains, the five sales were a
cumulative action because they "were part of a single project, were announced
simultaneously to a coalition of logging companies, and were reasonably foresee-
able." Id.
148. See id. at 1119 (noting that, in Blue Mountains, Corps failed to include in
its EA evaluation impacts of whole project).
149. See id. (holding Corps' analysis proper under CEQ regulations).
150. See id. (noting that, under NEPA, when Corps determines through EA
that federal action will not significantly affect environment, FONSI is issued).
151. See id. (disagreeing with trial court's ruling that sufficient questions were
raised about viability of fifty-two acre freshwater wetlands complex to require analy-
sis through full EIS).
152. Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1119 (quoting Northwest Resource Info.
Ctr. V. National Marine Fisheries Serv., 56 F.3d 1060, 1064 (1995)); see also CEQ,
NEPA and Agency Planning, 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (2000) and CEQ Environmental
Impact Statement, 40 C.F.R. § 1502.10 (2000).
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environmental impacts when determining impacts' significance. 15 3
Among other things, the agency must consider "[t]he degree to
which the effects . . . are likely to be highly controversial" and
"[t]he degree to which the effects ... involve unique or unknown
risks."' 54
The district court based its finding that the Corps should have
issued an EIS on the conclusion that there were substantial ques-
tions regarding the adequacy of the mitigation of the filled wet-
lands. 155 The Ninth Circuit, however, decided that the district
court's conclusion mischaracterized the evidence found in the ad-
ministrative record. 156 The Ninth Circuit also found that the
Corps' conclusion that the construction of the freshwater wetlands
system would result in a net environmental benefit was based upon
relevant and substantial data. 157 The Ninth Circuit further noted
that precedent supported the conclusion that when an agency bases
a FONSI upon relevant and substantial data, an alternative scien-
tific opinion does not render the agency's decision arbitrary and
capricious.1 58 Finally, the Ninth Circuit found that the Corps took
153. See Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1119 (citing CEQ Terminology
and Index, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (2000)).
154. Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.27 (b)(4), (b)(5) (2000)). The Ninth Cir-
cuit reviewed three issues in coming to its conclusion that a full EIS was not neces-
sary. See id. These issues included: (1) the untested nature of the freshwater
system; (2) mitigating factors; and (3) the public controversy. See id. at 1119-1122.
155. See id. at 1119 (noting that district court determined lack of EIS was arbi-
trary and capricious). "An agency must prepare an EIS if 'substantial questions'
are raised as to whether a project ... may cause significant degradation of some
human environmental factor." Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324, 1332
(citing LaFlamme v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 852 F.2d 389, 397 (9th Cir.
1988)). Adding to the belief that the Corps should have been required to submit
an EIS was the district court's finding that the record demonstrated many discrep-
ancies the Corps made, including ignoring comments, questioning the feasibility
of the wetland system, and concluding that the freshwater system would result in
an environmental benefit, were not supported by substantial evidence. See Wet-
lands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1119-20.
156. See Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1120 (finding letters from EPA
and FWS were requests for information and not contentions that freshwater wet-
land system was unfeasible). Contrary to the district court's determination, the
Ninth Circuit found that the record indicated the Corps considered each of these
issues and relied upon substantial evidence to support the freshwater system's via-
bility. See id. at 1120.
157. See id. at 1120 (explaining administrative record demonstrated that the
Corps "considered, inter alia, the biological needs of the native habitat and wildlife
of the region, water quality issues related to the project, the drainage, watershed
characteristics, water levels of the area, and possible flooding that may be associ-
ated with the freshwater system.").
158. See id. (citing Greenpeace Action, 14 F.3d at 1333); cf Foundation for North
America Wild Sheep v. United States Dep't. of Agric., 681 F.2d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir.
1982) (finding that an agency's failure to address "certain crucial factors, consider-
2002]
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"a hard look at the environmental consequences of allowing MTP-
PV to construct the freshwater wetlands system" and that the deci-
sion to issue a FONSI was not arbitrary and capricious.15 9
C. Mitigation Measures
The Ninth Circuit further examined whether the presence of
mitigating measures justified the Corps' decision to forego issuing
an EIS. 160 The EA issued by the Corps explained that filling the
wetlands would not significantly affect the environment and that
any resulting negative impacts would be mitigated by the creation
of the fifty-one acre freshwater system. 161 The Ninth Circuit found
WAN's contention that the Corps' decision to issue a FONSI was
arbitrary and capricious without merit.162
After a careful review of the record, the Ninth Circuit found
that the mitigation measures were developed to a reasonable de-
gree and reviewed by the Corps and other federal agencies at the
time the permit was issued. 163 The special conditions compensated
for the absence of a detailed mitigation plan. 164 The Ninth Circuit
also found that WAN exaggerated the need for mitigation and that
the record supported the findings that the development would in-
crease the wetland values of the area. 165 Finally, the court con-
cluded that the Corps did not act arbitrarily or capriciously by not
ation of which was essential to a truly informed decision whether or not to prepare
an EIS," rerldered unreasonable its decision that no EIS was necessary).
159. See Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1121.
160. See id. (indicating presence of mitigating factors may justify decision to
forego EIS and mitigating factors need not completely compensate for adverse
environmental impacts). "In evaluating the sufficiency of mitigation measures, we
focus on whether the mitigation measures constitute an adequate buffer against
the negative impacts that result from the authorized activity to render such impacts
so minor as to not warrant an EIS." Id. (citing Greenpeace Action, 14 F.3d at 1332).
161. See id. (describing Corps approval of incomplete mitigation plan but
placing special conditions in permit that MTP-PV was required to meet).
162. See id. (illustrating WAN's argument that Corps did not effectively evalu-
ate mitigation plan).
163. See id. (indicating WAN exaggerated deficiencies of mitigation plan
found in record).
164. See Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1121. The Ninth Circuit found
that the Corps could determine the precise nature of many of the mitigation mea-
sures at the time that it made the permitting decision. See id.; see also Robertson v.
Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 352 (1989). "[I]t would be inconsis-
tent with NEPA's reliance on procedural mechanisms - as opposed to substantive,
result based standards - to demand the presence of a fully developed plan that will
mitigate the environmental harm before an agency can act." Id.
165. See Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1122 (finding record supported
Corps' conclusion that Phase I would result in little wetland value being lost due to
highly degraded nature of wetlands).
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requiring an EIS for MTP-PV's application to fill 16.1 acres of de-
graded wetlands in light of the mitigating value of the freshwater
system. 166 The Ninth Circuit further expressed that communica-
tion among the Corps' officers did not undermine the Corps'
conclusion. 167
D. Public Controversy Argument
The Ninth Circuit reviewed WAN's final contention that the
Corps was required to prepare an EIS due to the public controversy
surrounding the decision to build the freshwater system. 168 The
court found that the types of objections raised did not render a
Corps' permitting decision controversial for NEPA purposes. 169
In conclusion, the Ninth Circuit restated its findings that MTP-
PV did not have a legally protected interest relating to WAN's
NEPA claims, that the Corps was justified in issuing the permit with-
out preparing an EIS, and that the Corps' determination of the
scope of NEPA review and its issuance of a FONSI was not arbitrary
and capricious. 170
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Wetlands Action Network provides wetlands developers with
even greater precedent to argue against attempts to use NEPA to
block projects.' 71 Had the Ninth Circuit assigned more weight to
the district court's decision, an EIS would have been required and
166. See id. at 1122 (indicating Corps need only find that mitigation measures
would render any environmental impact resulting from permit activity insignifi-
cant in order to issue FONSI.)
167. See id. (holding approval was neither arbitrary nor capricious).
168. See id. "The existence of a public controversy over the effect of an agency
action is one factor in determining whether the agency should prepare [an EIS]."
Id. (citing Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324, 1333 (9th Cir. 1992); see also
CEQ, Terminology and Index, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b) (4) (2002). "A federal action
is controversial if a substantial dispute exists as to [its] size, nature or effect." Wet-
lands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1122 (citing LaFlamme v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 852 F.2d at 389, 400-01 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)). "The existence of opposition to a use, however, does not render an action
controversial. See LaFlamme, 852 F.2d at 401.
169. See Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1122 (finding objections that do
not pertain to "size, nature or effect" are not controversial for NEPA purposes).
The controversial dispute surrounding the effects freshwater system would have on
the environment existed, but was resolved in the two-year review process. See id.
170. See id. (summarizing court's findings).
171. Ninth Circuit Rules That Wetland Work on Playa Vista Can Continue, 14 No. 6
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the project would not have been segmented into three phases. 172
Furthermore, the result would have been more consistent with
NEPA goals. 173 Instead, this decision represents what can best be
characterized as the "small handle" problem.174
By following Sylvester, the Ninth Circuit continues to support
the standards set forth by the "control and responsibility" regula-
tions which are inconsistent with NEPA's original purpose: to iden-
tify the environmental consequences of an action early in the
process in order to prevent the problem from escalating into crisis
proportions. 175 An EIS provides the means to understand the grav-
ity of environmental impacts and develop practical, less damaging
alternatives. 76
In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit chose to follow Sylvester instead
of relying on the district court's determination that Thomas should
guide the decision. 177 The current regulations allow the continua-
tion of the upland development in the absence of a permit, thereby
supporting the assertion that the Corps' regulatory jurisdiction did
not include the upland development. 178
Scholars suggest that "the jurisdictional interpretation of the
control and responsibility standard of Section 7(b) is inconsistent
with both the language of the regulation and the examples pro-
vided by Corps of how the regulation should be implemented."' 79
172. See Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d. at 1105 (overruling district court's
decision to require EIS).
173. For a further discussion of NEPA's intent, see supra note 60 and accompa-
nying text.
174. For a further discussion of the small handle problem, see supra note 100
and accompanying text.
175. For a further discussion of NEPA's intent, see supra note 60 and accompa-
nying text.
176. See Thatcher, supra note 60, at 755 (rejecting argument that too-broad
application of NEPA would trivialize law and force agencies to expend limited re-
sources foolishly).
177. See Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1118. The Ninth Circuit chose
not to follow the Thomas decision because the Corps only had independent juris-
diction over the parts of Phase I development that required the filling of wetlands.
See id.
178. See id. (observing regulatory jurisdiction over 16.1 acres involved in
Phase I development was not sufficient for Corps to assert "control and responsibil-
ity" over entire project).
179. Porterfield, supra note 7, at 56 (citing 53 Fed. Reg. 3,120 (1988)). The
control and responsibility rule states:
Scope of analysis.
(1) In some situations, a permit applicant may propose to conduct a spe-
cific activity requiring a Department of the Army (DA) permit (e.g., con-
struction of a pier in a navigable water of the United States) which is
merely one component of a larger project (e.g., construction of an oil
refinery on an upland area). The district engineer should establish the
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Scholars further suggest the Corps, under Section 7 (b), should con-
sider the upland aspects of shore side facilities that are clearly
outside the Corps' regulatory jurisdiction.' 80 Neither of these ap-
proaches satisfy the need for a consistent and useful rule to deter-
mine the scope of the Corps' regulatory jurisdiction.' 81 Experts
have also indicated that an analysis under NEPA, focusing upon the
scope of the federal action that triggers the environmental review,
provides less help than an analysis focusing upon the scope of the
environmental impacts of the federal action. 182
scope of the NEPA document (e.g., the EA or EIS) to address the impacts
of the specific activity requiring a DA permit and those portions of the
entire project over which the district engineer has sufficient control and
responsibility to warrant Federal review.
(2) The district engineer is considered to have control and responsibility
for portions of the project beyond the limits of the Corps' [sic] jurisdic-
tion where the Federal involvement is sufficient to turn an essentially pri-
vate action into a Federal action. These are cases where the
environmental consequences of the larger project are essentially products
of the Corps' [sic] permit action.
Typical factors to be considered in determining whether sufficient "con-
trol and responsibility" exists include:
(i) Whether or not the regulated activity comprises "merely a link" in a
corridor type project (e.g., a transportation or utility transmission
project).
(ii) Whether there are aspects of the upland facility in the immediate
vicinity of the regulated activity which affect the location and configura-
tion of the regulated activity.
(iii) The extent to which the entire. project will be within Corps
jurisdiction.
(iv) The extent of cumulative Federal control and responsibility. Federal
control and responsibility will include the portions of the project beyond
the limits of Corps jurisdiction where the cumulative Federal involvement
of the Corps and other Federal agencies is sufficient to grant legal control
over such additional portions of the project. These are cases where the
environmental consequences of the additional portions of the projects
are essential products of Federal financing, assistance, direction, regula-
tion, or approval ....
Id.; see also Corps of Engineers, Department of the Army, Processing of Depart-
ment of the Army Permits, 33 C.F.R. pt. 325, App. B § 7(b) (1995).
180. See Porterfield, supra note 7, at 57. Porterfield indicates that, "under [§]
7(b) the relevant inquiry is not whether an environmental impact occurs within
waters subject to [ ] Corps regulatory power, but rather whether the overall level of
federal involvement in a given project warrants evaluating the environmental im-
pacts of the entire project ...." Id.
181. See id. Neither of the enumerated approaches focuses upon the actual
matter at issue, namely the scope of the environmental impacts of the federal ac-
tion. See id.
182. See id.
NEPA requires an agency undertaking an action with potentially signifi-
cant environmental impacts to consider environmental factors which
might otherwise be irrelevant to its decision making process. Thus, focus-
ing on the scope of the Corps' regulatory jurisdiction or the overall level
of its substantive involvement in a project is unlikely to provide a useful
2002]
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A. The Independent Utility Test
The independent utility test provides another mechanism for
the Ninth Circuit and other courts to use when finding in favor of
developers and against environmental groups. 183 The independent
utility test allowed the Ninth Circuit to support the Corps' finding
that the three phases were separable for purposes of evaluating en-
vironmental impacts. 184 Without this test, the Corps could have
likely asserted enough "control and responsibility" over the devel-
opment to require an EIS for the entire project. 18 5 Even though
the Ninth Circuit appears justified in deciding that the three phases
could be separated given precedent and the independent utility
test, it seems that some of the cases should have been construed in
a different light.186
First, although the Ninth Circuit distinguished Blue Mountains,
in holding that five timber sales should be considered as a single
project, each of these sales could have been construed as having
independent utility since a single sale could certainly exist without
the other four.18 7 The district court applied this reasoning in Wet-
lands Action Network and determined that the three phases of the
project should be reviewed independently. 88 Applying the inde-
pendent utility test, the Ninth Circuit, in contrast, concluded that
the three phases in Wetlands Action Network were not cumulative ac-
tions.18 9 "The CEQ regulations implementing NEPA require that
an agency consider 'connected actions' and 'cumulative actions'
within a single EA or EIS." 190 The Ninth Circuit found, however,
analysis regarding the separate issue of what potential environmental im-
pacts must be evaluated under NEPA in determining whether to grant a
permit.
Id.
183. For a further discussion of the "independent utility" test, see supra note
104 and accompanying text.
184. See id.
185. For a further discussion of "control and responsibility" regulations, see
supra note 179 and accompanying text.
186. See Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1118. The district court relied
unsuccessfully upon Thomas and Blue Mountains, each requiring the Corps to con-
sider several phases of a project in one EIS. See id.
187. See generally Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208
(9th Cir. 1998).
188. See generally Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d 1105 (2000) (finding each
phase possessed independent utility).
189. See id. 1117-19 (characterizing alternatives as impractical).
190. Id. at 1118 (noting that while federal agencies define scope of NEPA
review, connected or cumulative actions must be considered together).
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that the three phases were not cumulative actions. 191 The Ninth
Circuit, in Thomas, predicted that the decision in Wetlands Action
Network, finding:
'" While it is true that administrative agencies must be given
considerable discretion in defining the scope of environ-
mental impact statements, there are situations in which an
agency is required to consider several related actions in a
single EIS. Not to require this would permit dividing a
project into multiple "actions," each of which individually
has an insignificant environmental impact, but which col-
lectively have a substantial impact.19 2
The Ninth Circuit repeated the decision it made in Sylvester
and characterized the actions as multiple actions.'9 3 The court's
reasoning, however, is not outrageous given the "independent util-
ity" test and the "control and responsibility" regulations. 94 Al-
though the court's analysis may be acceptable according to the
current regulations and precedent, the Ninth Circuit's decisions
and the application of regulations has moved away from the origi-
nal intent and purpose of NEPA.195 The Corps might be correct in
concluding that the value of the wetlands will be improved through
191. See id. (stating three phases were not supported by CEQ regulations or
precedent).
192. Thomas v. Patterson, 753 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Thatcher, supra
note 60, at 630 (noting courts often go too far by claiming same results could be
reached by requiring cumulative action or cumulative impact analysis).
If actions are connected, CEQ regulations require that they be consid-
ered in one EA or EIS for purposes of analysis and decision, just like
cumulative actions. This is true, however, even if not all of the connected
actions have ripened into proposals as in Thomas v. Peterson. The require-
ment to bundle all cumulative actions into one EIS arises only when those
actions are proposed actions. Thus, if a future plan is not connected to
other actions and is not yet actually proposed, it need not be included in
an environmental review of a pending proposal for decision making
purposes.
Id.
193. For a further discussion of the Sylvester decision, see supra notes 99-112
and accompanying text.
194. For a further discussion of "control and responsibility" regulations, see
supra note 179 and accompanying text.
195. For a further discussion of NEPA's purpose, see supra note 74 and accom-
panying text. Allowing the project to be segmented led to the conclusion that an
EIS did not need to be prepared for Phase I of the project. See Wetlands Action
Network, 222 F.3d at 1118-19 (discussing segmentation of the project).
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the mitigation process, but should be more cautious with scarce
natural resources and require an EIS to be completed. 196
B. Reasonably Foreseeable Impacts Test
Rather than relying on the tests described above, perhaps
courts should borrow from the law of torts and focus on the con-
cept of "reasonable foreseeability" of consequences that will result
from federal actions. 197 Scholars have intimated that CEQ regula-
tions mandated this standard similar to the "reasonably close causal
relationship" rule the Supreme Court applied in PANE.198 Under
this approach, the Corps would be required to address reasonably
foreseeable significant environmental impacts of the proposed per-
mit in an EIS. 199 Accordingly, the first step in determining whether
a potential impact necessitates analysis pursuant to NEPA, is to de-
termine whether granting the permit is the "but for" cause of the
environmental impact.200
The Ninth Circuit, in Sylvester, and the Supreme Court, in
PANE, both found that requiring an evaluation of all the possible
environmental impacts of a proposed federal action would be too
broad and impractical. 20 1 Later, the Ninth Circuit, in Wetlands Ac-
tion Network, also asserted that agencies are not required to do the
impractical. 20 2 Therefore, the "reasonable foreseeability" approach
is a practical way for the Corps to determine if a significant impact
196. See Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1119 (noting "NEPA does not
require the government to do the impractical and that the agency's determination
of the scope of an EIS is entitled to deference . . ").
197. See Porterfield, supra note 7, at 58 (remarking that once some federal
involvement is established, focus should be on scope of federal issue).
198. See id. (indicating standard is simple when "reasonably foreseeable" im-
pacts are determined).
199. See id.
The logic of the reasonable foreseeability approach is self-evident. The
Corps cannot be expected to consider the environmental impacts of its
permitting decisions which it cannot reasonably foresee. Conversely, if it
is reasonably foreseeable that a significant environmental impact will re-
sult from a permitted action, then it is appropriate to address that impact
in an EIS on the proposed permit.
Id. at 59 (citing Colorado River Indian Tribes v. Marsh, 605 F. Supp. 1425, 1434 (C.D.
Cal. 1985) (stating agency's responsibility under NEPA is to include predicting
environmental effects of proposed action before action is taken and effects of ac-
tion are fully realized).
200. See id. (focusing on impact of reasonable foreseeability standard).
201. See id. (citing PANE, 460 U.S. 776, 777-78 (1983); Sylvester v. United States
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 884 F.2d 394, 401 (9th Cir. 1989).
202. See generally Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2000).
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will result from a permitted action.20 3 If the impact is not reasona-
bly foreseeable, the Corps does not have to address that impact in
an EIS on the proposed permit.20 4 Furthermore, the "reasonable
foreseeability" test is more efficient than the "links of chain" test
adopted in Sylvester and applied in Wetlands Action Network.205 The
"links of chain" test does not address whether the impacts of a pri-
vate action, functionally interdependent of a federal action, must
be considered in an EIS on the federal action. 20 6 Had the Ninth
Circuit, in Wetlands Action Network, been required to use a "reasona-
ble foreseeability" approach, the district court's decision to require
an EIS might have been upheld.20 7 Instead, the Corps was able to
review the environmental impacts of the federal portion of the pro-
ject without considering the non-federal portion of the project.20 8
The "reasonable forseeability" approach can help diffuse the confu-
sion surrounding the uncertainty of the proper scope of environ-
mental review by focusing on "the real issue - the scope of the
environmental impacts of the action."209
VI. IMPACT
Had the Ninth Circuit considered cumulative or indirect ef-
fects, instead of implementing the "control and responsibility" reg-
ulations alone, the "small handle" problem in this instance would
have been diminished. As one expert lamented,
The irony in the "small handle" logic is that the larger a
project gets the smaller the scope of the Corps' NEPA
203. See Porterfield, supra note 7, at 59 (characterizing approach as logical
since Corps cannot consider environmental impacts of permitting decisions it can-
not reasonably foresee).
204. See id. (noting this standard would usually result in same end as that in
Corps' permitting regulation).
205. For a further discussion of the test adopted in Sylvester, see supra notes 99-
112 and accompanying text.
206. See Porterfield, supra note 7, at 60.
Unlike the reasonable foreseeability standard, however, the links of chain
approach does not directly address which environmental impacts of a fed-
eral action must be covered in an EIS. Instead, it concentrates on the
proximity of the functional relationship of the federal action to associ-
ated private action in order to determine whether the impacts of the pri-
vate action should be considered in an EIS on the federal action.
Id.
207. For a further discussion of the "reasonable foreseeability" approach, see
infra notes 202-04 and accompanying text.
208. See Porterfield, supra note 7, at 62 (asserting limitation on review does
not compromise NEPA's goal of informed decision making).
209. Id. The "reasonable foreseeablity" standard provides a practical limita-
tion on federal review of environmental impacts. See id.
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analysis becomes, at least theoretically. This could lead to
the very situation the concept was supposed to avoid -
where the Corps is preparing an EIS on projects with less
significant impacts simply because its jurisdictional basis is
proportionately larger than it might be in other cases in-
volving larger projects with greater impacts. 210
The Ninth Circuit's decision follows the legacy of Sylvester,
promulgating the idea that the Corps is only required to review
those environmental impacts over which it exercises "sufficient con-
trol and responsibility."2 1 This allowed the cumulative effects of a
golf course and a resort to be reviewed separately.212 This ap-
proach is counterintuitive since the environmental impacts of a golf
course or a resort considered separately are significantly less sub-
stantial than the environmental impacts of the construction of each
facility considered together.213
Similarly, in Wetlands Action Network, the Corps was allowed to
segment the massive proposal into three phases because they could
proceed independently of each other.214 Furthermore, the Corps
was not required to prepare an EIS to determine the environmental
impacts of the wetlands and upland development due to insuffi-
cient "control and responsibility" over the upland development.215
As a result, the environmental effects of the three phases of the
project together would not be evaluated except through a prelimi-
nary EA. 216 Whether or not the Corps has sufficient control or re-
sponsibility does not change the fact that there will eventually be
massive development covering over 1,000 acres. 217
210. Parenteau, supra note 41, at 757 (suggesting question be framed as one
of cumulative or indirect impacts since effects must be considered regardless of
Corps' jurisdiction).
211. See Porterfield, supra note 7, at 62 (noting current uncertainty surround-
ing scope of Corps environmental review).
212. See Sylvester v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 884 F.2d 394, 394 (9th Cir.
1989) (finding resort and entire complex would benefit from the other's presence,
but were not sufficiently related to constitute a single "federal action" for NEPA
purposes).
213. See Porterfield, supra note 7, at 62 (referring to impacts that projects or
industrial facilities may have on environment).
214. See Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1122 (concluding district court
erred in finding issuance of permit without preparing EIS violated NEPA).
215. See id. at 1116 (holding linkage between "permitted activity and specific
project planned is the type of 'interdependence' that is found in any situation
where a developer seeks to fill a wetland as part of large development project.").
216. See id.
217. See id. (allowing 21.4 acres of federal wetlands to be developed without
examination of cumulative impacts).
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With decisions like Wetlands Action Network, courts are moving
farther from NEPA's original purpose. 218 While the three phases of
this project have independent utility, the final outcome will be a
multifaceted complex that serves many needs but has significant cu-
mulative negative impacts on the environment. 219 This decision, as
well as others like it continually evade NEPA goals. 220 If the courts
persist in following this line of reasoning, the problems NEPA was
created to prevent will undoubtedly continue. 221 One expert
poignantly addressed the bottom line, averring:
Nowhere are we looking at the cumulative impacts of a
lost acre this week in San Francisco Bay, another ten acres
in Grays Harbor, a hundred in the Williamette Valley, a
dozen in the Frazier River Valley, an oil development on a
molting lake on Alaska's north slope. It all harkens back
to our inability to see the beauty, the life, the elegance of
mud and to understand what glops and hisses at our feet is
connected by invisible threads of consequence to the crea-
tures that glide so purposefully across our skies each
spring and fall. We are slowly strangling the flyway. One
day, we may look out over an endless plain of concrete
and asphalt and glass and find that we have drained the
skies. 222
Elizabeth A. Roche
218. See Thatcher, supra note 60, at 646.
The primary purpose of NEPA today is to gather information. In that
informational task, however, NEPA is to be all-encompassing. The whole
purpose of NEPA is to put to the test those who do not believe that a five
acre fill matters. Congress passed NEPA out of concern that our limited
natural resources are being lost in "small but steady increments." It is
only if we conduct a cumulative impact review that we will know whether
the developers or the local bird watchers are right. The result should not
be prejudged as a way to avoid preparation of an EIS.
Id.
219. For a further discussion of the MTP-PV project, see supra note 15, and
accompanying text.
220. See Parenteau, supra note 41, at 748-49.
Essentially, the courts have been making ad hoc subjective judgments
about 'how much' federal participation is needed to federalize a
nonfederal project. This is understandable because the courts have had
very little 'law to apply. .. .' In the absence of clear legal standards, the
facts have controlled the outcomes of cases.
Id.
221. See Thatcher, supra note 60, at 647.
222. See id. (indicating that cumulative impacts of small state action must be
reviewed to understand environment).
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